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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under section 78A-4~103(2)(j) of
the Utah Code Annotated. The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction under
section 78A-3-102(3)(j) of the Utah Code Annotated.

ISSUES
1.

A party is entitled to question prospective jurors about their biases

and affiliations with the parties so as to challenge jurors for cause and to exercise
peremptory challenges intelligently. The defendant, Timpanogos Regional
Hospital ("the Hospital"), is part of HCA (Hospital Corporation of America), a
national hospital chain. The trial court precluded the plaintiffs from mentioning
HCA to prospective jurors. Did the trial court impermissibly limit the plaintiffs'
voir dire?
Preservation: The issue was raised in the plaintiffs' memorandum in
opposition to the Hospital's motion in limine to preclude any mention of HCA
(Record ("R.") 1832-96) and in the oral arguments on that motion and on the
plaintiffs' motion to take judicial notice of the Hospital's website (see R. 3026, at
26:12-36:10; R. 3017, at 35:12-40:17).

1

Standard of Review: Challenges to the trial court's management of jury
voir dire are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.1
2.

Otherwise irrelevant evidence may be admitted to cure a misleading

action. In his opening statement, counsel for the Hospital told the jury that the
plaintiffs were seeking millions of dollars from "your community hospital." To
correct this and similar misstatements, the plaintiffs moved to introduce evidence
that the Hospital was not a public, community hospital but was owned by HCA.
Did the trial court err in denying their motion?
Preservation: After the trial court precluded the plaintiffs from
mentioning HCA, the plaintiffs twice moved for permission to introduce
evidence of HCA or, alternatively, to prevent the Hospital from referring to itself
as a small "community hospital," and the parties argued the motions extensively.
{See R. 3018, at 444:21-445:9; R. 2527-55; R. 3021, at 1552:7-1565:12; R. 3022, at
1582:5-1611:8.)

1

E.g., Alcazar v. University of Utah Hosps. & Clinics, 2008 UT App 222, f
9,188 P.3d 490.
2

Standard of Review: A trial court's decision on curative admissibility of
evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.2
3.

A party is entitled to show the bias of a witness. Three witnesses

had significant relationships with HCA, the Hospital's parent corporation, but
the trial court's ruling preventing the plaintiffs from mentioning HCA prevented
the plaintiffs from exploring those relationships and thus potential bias. Did the
trial court impermissibly limit the plaintiffs' examination of witnesses?
Preservation: The issue was raised in the plaintiffs' memorandum in
opposition to the Hospital's motion in limine to preclude any mention of HCA
(R. 1832-96), in the oral arguments on that motion (see R. 3026, at 26:12-36:10; R.
3017, at 35:12-40:17), in the plaintiffs' subsequent motions for permission to
introduce evidence of HCA (R. 3018, at 444:21-24; R. 2527-55), and in the
arguments on those motions (see R. 3018, at 444:21-445:9; R. 3021, at 1552:71565:12; R. 3022, at 1582:5-1611:8).
Standard of Review: A trial court's exclusion of evidence is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion.3 In determining whether the right of cross-examination

2

Barson ex rel. Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 840

(Utah 1984).
3

E.g., Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, \ 21,190 P.3d 1269.
3

has been unduly restricted, an appellate court considers the nature of the
excluded inquiry, whether the field of inquiry was adequately covered by other
questions that were allowed, and the overall quality of the cross-examination
viewed in relation to the issues actually litigated at trial.4
4.

A plaintiff may offer rebuttal evidence to refute the testimony of a

defense witness, even if the testimony is somewhat repetitive of evidence in the
plaintiffs case-in-chief. The trial court excluded Dr. Nageotte, one of the
plaintiffs' proposed rebuttal experts, on the grounds that his testimony would
have been cumulative. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in doing so?
Preservation: The plaintiffs designated Dr. Nageotte as an expert witness
they might call at trial. (R. 201, <f 6; R. 205,12; R. 1011,%4.) The Hospital moved
in limine to limit his testimony on the standard of care. (R. 1386.) The plaintiffs
responded to that motion. (R. 1946-64.) The parties argued the motion at trial,
and the court took the motion under advisement. (R. 3019, at 811:17-822:11.)
After the Hospital rested, the plaintiffs asked to read Dr. Nageotte's deposition in
rebuttal, but the court denied their request. (R. 3023, at 2084:17-2093:13.)

4

98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 467, at 442, n.15 (2002) (citing State v. Lewis, 717
A.2d 1140 (Conn. 1998)).
4

Standard of Review: A trial court's refusal to allow a tvhntt ii -.. i m ^
reviewed for abuse of discretion. 5
5-

A party does not have to disclose a rebuttal witness if the need for

her testimony could not have reasonably been anticipated. The plaintiffs wanted
to call a rebuttal witness to show that Ms. Harvey, the Hospital's liability witness,
had recently taught nurses contrary to her trial testimony. The trial court
excluded the witness because she was not disclosed within the time for disclosing
witnesses, even though she v\ ould have testified about events that only recently
occurred. Did the trial court err?
Preservation: This issue was raised at trial (See R. 3023, at 2077:7-2084:9.)
Standard of Review: A trial courl's refusal to allow a rebuttal witness is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. 6
6

A witness may qualify as an expert by education, training, or

experience. The plaintiffs wanted to call an expert who the Hospital had
designated as an expert and who had worked as a labor and delivery nurse and

5

See Astill v. Clark 956 P.2d 1081,1087 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
(concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding rebuttal
evidence).
6

See id.
5

taught labor and delivery nurses. The trial court excluded her testimony. Did
the trial court abuse its discretion in doing so?
Preservation: The plaintiffs raised the possibility of using the witness's
deposition at trial when the trial court allowed the Hospital to withdraw the
witness as an expert and substitute Ms. Harvey. (R. 3014, at 28:1-29:13.) The
Hospital filed a motion in limine to exclude the witness's testimony at trial. (R.
1067.) The plaintiffs opposed the motion. (R. 1974-2123.) The parties argued the
motion at trial, and the court granted the motion. (R. 3019, at 804:15-811:16.)
Standard of Review: A trial court's ruling on an expert witness's
qualifications is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.7

DETERMINATIVE RULES
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(4) is determinative of the fifth issue.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a) and Utah Rule of Evidence 702(a) are
determinative of the sixth issue. These rules are set out in the addendum.

Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329,1337 (Utah 1993).
6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in Hie I "iiin11
Below,
This is a medical malpractice case. The plaintiffs, Ryan and Mandy

Braithwaite, brought this action against Mandy's obstetrician, Dr. Robert C
Richards, and against Timpanogos Regional Hospital ("the Hospital"), alleging
that the defendants' negligence in monitoring Mandy's labor and delivering their
son Trevin caused Trevin to be deprived of oxygen and consequently to be born
with severe and permanent brain damage. (See R. 87-92.) Dr. Richards settled
with the plaintiffs before trial and was dismissed from the case. (See R. 936-37.)
The case went to trial against the Hospital. The jury returned a verdict in favor of
the Hospital, finding that it did not breach the standard of care. (R. at 2724-2727.)
The plaintiffs have appealed from the judgment entered on that verdict.
(Additional facts relating to the course of proceedings in the trial court and the
issues on appeal are set oiit in the Statement of Facts and the Argument, infra J
B

Statement of Facts
The Braithwaites went to the Hospital in the early morning of January 2,

1999. Mandy Braithwaite was in labor, having been induced the afternoon
before. (See R. 3021, at 1479:22-1480:12.) During labor, fetal heart monitoring

7

showed a troubling pattern of decelerations in the baby's heart rate, which
correlate with a decrease in oxygen. (See, e.g., R. 3018, at 391:7-395:8.; R. 3020, at
1184:1-1196:9.) There was a prolonged deceleration at about 4:30 a.m., while Dr.
Richards was attaching an internal fetal heart monitor to Trevin's scalp. Mandy
was then repositioned, and Trevin's heart rate recovered. (See R. 3018, at 392:321; R. 3020, at 1188:15-1190:17.) Dr. Richards then left the Hospital. (See R. 3019,
at 940:22-941:5.) Trevin continued to experience decelerations in his heart rate
until about 5:50 a.m., when he had another severe, prolonged deceleration. (See
R. 3018, at 394:24-395:8.) Virginia Law, the nurse caring for Mandy at the time,
was relatively new to the labor and delivery floor. (See R. 3019, at 829:14-831:6.)
She did not advise Dr. Richards of any of these decelerations. At 6:00 a.m., a new
nurse (Rynda Christensen) came on duty. (See R. 3019, at 866:11-17.) At 6:03
a.m., Trevin suffered another prolonged deceleration. The new nurse had Dr.
Richards called at about 6:05 a.m. (See id. at 871:20-873:3, 946:1-21.) Dr. Richards
ordered an emergency Caesarean section and returned immediately to the
Hospital. (Id. at 947:10-19.) Trevin was delivered at 6:28 a.m. (See id. at 950:1322.) He was "basically dead"; his Apgar score was zero. (R. 3018, at 447:12-15.)
The resuscitation team was eventually able to resuscitate Trevin, but he is now

8

severely disabled. He suffers from mixed cerebral palsy, with elements of both
spastic quadriplegic cerebral palsy and extrapyramidal cerebral palsy, the type of
cerebral palsy characteristically seen after near total acute asphyxia at birth. (See
id at 540:3 10; R. 3020, \ it 1 001 :21 24, 1 060:12-19.) I he plaintiffs claimed that the
Hospital, aetiiig through its labor and delivery nurses, breached the applicable
standard oi can1 by not calling 1 >r. Richards sooner and that, because of the
I l o s p i t a l s bivtu li, I t w i n w a s d e p r i v e d oi o w g c n :<»r ? n e x t e n d e d p e r i o d oi t i m e
(/atisiug IniIi In I it1 Inn in n ill) i e r e b r a l r \*;^

r ••• i l a m t i t t s c l a i m e d that, i 1 lite

( l o s ( n l a l h a d t aiillcd I'hi Is' n In, in nils alia > • i ! - u , i i i i , ' 'i.,:; \ } p . *» hi- u o u l u
II i \ v I K N a n a b l e I< * 1 * • I • *«*»"i I i •"» " n I » \ »
si iffered ai t/y ir tji n y

(See'R

3018 at 5-

v4n would not have
* *h4 •

•. - • 4-953:1';'.)

li t tl le coi use of discov ery tl te I lospital desigi lated I axiiie A i iderson, a
local iiiiif'si', to sarve .ii lis r^|"t tl

n lln iniiMiij; sftiinLiml i»l ran 1 \K, J4!v4y i

Ixliiisi Aanlai'snii ivas. do|u >*,n i and tin iiastiim a \\ w as anneal nl ilia' I Inspilal in
some iiespeels |S<r, <\<s> h l 101.,7 iid'.h 111),',U I 1 > 11 i llitl l.s all | ;\l!ei iin
deadline for designating experts 1 lad passed (ai id a fter ne v v coi J i isel ei itered ai t
appearance for the I lospital) tl te I lospital desigi lated. a i !ev\ > m n "sii ig expert (R.
595-98.) The trial court allow ed tl le I lospita 1 to desigi late a i iew i n irsing expert

9

over the plaintiffs7 objection {see R. 736-45), but indicated that it was inclined to
let the plaintiffs use Nurse Anderson's deposition at trial if she would not testify.
{See R. 3014, at 28:1-29:13.) But at trial, the court granted the Hospital's motion in
limine to exclude Nurse Anderson's testimony on the standard of care for the
Hospital. (R. 3019, at 810:18-811:11.)
Before trial, the plaintiffs asked the court to take judicial notice of the
Hospital's website (R. 1039-51), which included a link to an HCA Healthcare
website {see R. 1045.) The Hospital is owned by HCA (aka Hospital Corporation
of America). The trial court indicated that it would have taken judicial notice of
the Hospital's website but for the reference to HCA. (R. 3026, at 34:4-16, 35:3-5.)
The Hospital filed motions in limine to preclude any reference to the
wealth or poverty of the parties (R. 1062-64) and to preclude any mention of
HCA at trial (R. 1211-31). The plaintiffs agreed not to mention the wealth or
poverty of either party (R. 1599), but argued that evidence of the Hospital's
affiliation with HCA was relevant, not only as background information but also
to discover biases of prospective jurors and to cross-examine the Hospital's
witnesses for bias. (R. 1832-96.) The plaintiffs specifically asked to show the
affiliation between the Hospital and HCA "to show that Timpanogos is not a

10

tiny, rural hospital but, instead, has the equipment,

a network where it can

get equipment, staff, training on a par with hospitals around the country." (R.
3026, at 27:20-24.) The plaintiffs requested four voir dire questions going to
prospective jurors' contacts with IICA and the effect those experiences may have
had on their opinions about the Hospital. (See R. 2421-22.) The trial court
initially indicated that it would allow the plaintiffs to question prospective jurors
in voir dire about any relationship they may have to HCA but would exclude any
reference to HCA during the trial. (R. 3026, at 34:17-35:5.) Bui the court idle.
reversed itself and refused to let the plaintiffs mention HCA even in voir dire.
(R. 3017, at 35:12-40:10.)
During the Hospital's opening statement, counsel for the Hospital referred
to the Hospital as "a community hospital in Orem" (R. 3018, at 368:21), and told
the jury: "Yoi i heard Ms. Lybbert [plaintiffs' counsel] saying that she wants 11 to
$15 million from your community hospital/' (Id. at 374:13-15 (emphasis added).)
At a break, outside the presence of the jury, the plaintiffs renewed their motion to
talk about I ICA based on defense counsel's opening statement, but the trial court
denied the motion. (See id. at 444:21-445:9.) Defense counsel made similar
references to tlle I lospital as a "community hospital" throughout the plaintiffs'

case-in-chief. (See id. at 468:15-16; R. 3020, at 1126:25-1127:3,1251:15-16.) The
plaintiffs filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its ruling precluding them
from mentioning HCA, on the grounds that the Hospital had created a
misleading and prejudicial impression in the minds of the jurors that it was
simply a small, community-owned hospital that could not afford to pay a multimillion dollar verdict and not part of a for-profit national hospital chain. (R.
2526-52.) But the trial court denied the motion. (See also R. 3021, at 1552:71565:12; R. 3022, at 1582:5-1611:8.)
During the trial testimony of Dr. Richards, the jury heard a passing
reference by Dr. Richards to the Hospital as "an HCA hospital." (R. 3019, at
912:6-7.) But the plaintiffs were precluded from cross-examining the Hospital's
witnesses regarding their relationship to HCA. (See, e.g., id. at 860:3-864:17.)
The Hospital's expert on the standard of care, Nurse Carol Harvey, counts
HCA as one of her clients and has served as an expert for HCA in other cases
involving HCA hospitals, including another HCA hospital in Utah. (See R. 1849,
at 150:16-151:12; R. 1894.) She was aware of three or four HCA hospitals she had
testified for in the last two to four years and has done training programs at HCA
hospitals. (See R. 2546; R. 2529, at 14:7-15:1,17:5-22.).

12

Ms. Harvey testified at trial regarding the standard of care for labor and
delivery nurses, lii the course of her testimony, she said, "I don't want you to
think Fm not testifying the same as I've done in other places." (R. 3022, at 1655:81 0.) The plaintiffs had a rebuild! witness, Judith Walker, who had recently
become aware of a seminar that Ms. Harvey had taught just a few weeks before
trial. Ms. Walker was prepared to say that what Ms. Harvey taught nurses was
different from what she testified to, but the trial o .'ii rt would not allow the
plaintiffs to call Ms. Walker as a rebuttal witness. (See R. 3023, at 2077:20-2084:9.)
The trial court also precluded the plaintiffs from presenting the deposition
testimony of Dr. Michael Nageotte in rebuttal. (Id. at 2084:17-2093:13.) Dr.
Nageotte would have rebutted Nurse Harvey's testimony on the interpretation of
the fetal monitoring strips in the case. (See id. at 2085:22-24.)
Additional facts relating to the issues on appeal are set out in the
argument, infra.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I he trial court's evidentiary rulings deprived the plaintiffs of a fair trial.

Its decision to preclude the plaintiffs from mentioning HCA, the Hospital's
parent company, permeated every aspect of the trial, from jury selection through
closing arguments. It prevented the plaintiffs from challenging potential jurors
for cause and from exercising their peremptory challenges intelligently. (Pt. LA.)
By precluding the plaintiffs from showing the Hospital's affiliation with
HCA, the trial court also left the jury with the erroneous impression that the
defendant was just a "small community hospital/' Defense counsel took
advantage of this ruling repeatedly to imply to the jury that the Hospital did not
have the resources to pay a verdict and that a verdict against the Hospital would
hurt the jurors' community. (Pt. LB.)
The ruling also prevented the plaintiffs from showing the jury the bias of
three critical witnesses-the two nurses involved and the Hospital's only liability
expert, Ms. Harvey. All depended on HCA, the Hospital's parent corporation,
for all or part of their livelihoods, yet the plaintiffs could not show the jury the
significant potential for bias that these witnesses had. At the same time, the
Hospital was able to suggest that the plaintiffs' experts were biased because of
their relationships with the law firm representing the plaintiffs and with other
plaintiffs. (Pt.I.C.)

14

Not only did the trial court prevent the plaintiffs from fully exploring Ms.
Harvey's bias on cross-examination, but it also prevented the plaintiffs from
calling any witness to rebut her testimony. (Pt. II.) Dr. Nageotte would have
rebutted her testimony on the proper interpretation of the fetal heart monitoring
strip. (See pt. TT -V) Judiih Walker would have shown that what Ms. Harvey
taught nurses was different from what she told tlu ju ry. -KSec pt. ILB.) And
Laurie Anderson, who was previously iuiS fo ward as an expert by the Hospital
itself, would have refuted parts of Ms. Harvey's testimony. (See pt. II.C.) The
trial court excluded all of them from testifying, for various reasons. But the mere
fact that some of their testimony may have been cumulative of other testimony
did not justify excluding them entirely.
The cumulative effect of the I rial court's rulings was to make Ms. Harvey's
testimony bulletproof. The plaintiffs could not show her bias on cross
examination, and they could not call a rebuttal witness to refute her testimony.
As the Hospitals only expert on the standard of care applicable to the Hospital
and its nurses, Si>. i larvey was the key witness in the case. Her testimony was
diametrically opposed to that -i -»=: | >Iaintiffs' nursing expert, Dr. I,aura
Mahlmeister. (Compare, e.g., B. >iL\. ii «(>l VI ^ 17 {Uthe nurses caring for this

mother and baby, met the standard of care appropriate for that time in this
state") (testimony of Ms. Harvey), with R. 3018, at 412:13-14 ("the nurses
breached the standard of care in failing to call Dr. Richards sooner") (testimony
of Dr. Mahlmeister).) The jury chose to believe Ms. Harvey over Dr.
Mahlmeister. Had the trial court allowed the plaintiffs to properly challenge Ms.
Harvey's credibility and conclusions, "a different result may well have been
reached."8 The trial court therefore committed reversible error.9 (Pt. III.)

ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED THE PLAINTIFFS OF A FAIR TRIAL
BY PRECLUDING THEM FROM MENTIONING HCA AT TRIAL.
By precluding the plaintiffs from mentioning HCA, the Hospital's parent
company, at trial, the trial court did three things that deprived the plaintiffs of a
fair trial: (1) It prevented the plaintiffs from obtaining critical information that
would have enabled them to challenge jurors for cause and intelligently use their
peremptory challenges; (2) it prevented the plaintiffs from correcting the

8

Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081,1087 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).

9

See id.
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Hospital's misleading characterization of itself to the jury as "your community
hospital"; and (3) it prevented the plaintiffs from effectively cross-examining the
Hospital's key witnesses.
A.

The Trial Court Erred by Limiting the Plaintiffs' Voir Dire.
Voir dire serves two purposes: (1) it allows counsel to uncover biases of

individual jurors to support a challenge for cause; and (2) it allows counsel to
gather information to intelligently use peremptory challenges.10 "Under Utah
law, 'a trial judge should liberally allow questions designed to discover attitudes
and biases, both conscious and subconscious, even though such questions go
beyond that needed for challenges for cause.'"11
Here, the trial court foreclosed a whole area of relevant inquiry by refusing
to allow the plaintiffs to mention HCA, the Hospital's parent company, during
voir dire. Because the plaintiffs could not mention HCA, they could not
determine whether any of the prospective jurors had significant contacts or
experiences with HCA or other HCA facilities that may have resulted in "hidden

10

Alcazar v. University of Utah Hosps. & Clinics, 2008 UT App 222, <f 10,
188 P.3d 490 (citation omitted).
11

Id. (quoting Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1991),
cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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or subconscious biases affecting the jurors' ability to render a fair and impartial
verdict/712 The trial court therefore abused its discretion in not allowing the
plaintiffs to inquire about prospective jurors' connections with HCA.
This error was harmful because it precluded the plaintiffs from challenging
prospective jurors for cause and from exercising their peremptory challenges
effectively. Another juror who had connections with and opinions about the
Hospital was excused for cause. (See R. 3017, at 19:18-21:3, 46:7-52:23.) But the
plaintiffs could not explore the possible biases of other prospective jurors who
may have had opinions about HCA or HCA hospitals generally.
"[Substantial impairment of the right to informed exercise of peremptory
challenges is reversible error/' 13 Considering "the totality of the questioning,
counsel [was not] afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information
necessary to evaluate" prospective jurors.14 Plaintiffs' counsel "was denied

12

Id. 114 (quoting Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96,102. n.7 (Utah Ct.

App. 1993)).
13

Id. 115 (quoting Barrett, 868 P.2d at 102) (internal quotation marks

omitted).
14

Id. (quoting Barrett, 868 P.2d at 102-03 (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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information helpful in the intelligent use of [her] peremptory challenges/
Consequently, the trial court committed prejudicial error when it precluded the
plaintiffs from mentioning HCA in voir dire.
B,

The Trial Court Erred by Not Allowing the Plaintiffs to Show the
Connection Between HCA and the Hospital to Correct the Hospital's
Misleading Characterization of Itself.
In response to the Hospital's standard motion in limine to exclude any

reference to the wealth or poverty of the parties because any such reference
would appeal to prejudice or sympathy of the jury, the plaintiffs agreed not to
refer to such matters and noted that the Hospital should be similarly precluded.
(R. 1599.) The Hospital then turned around and, in opening statement, appealed
to the jurors' sympathy and self-interest by telling the jury that the plaintiffs were
seeking millions of dollars from "your community hospital." (R. 3018, at 374:1315.) The Hospital continued to refer to itself as a small community hospital
throughout the trial. (See, e.g., id. at 468:15-16; R. 3020, at 1126:25-1127:3,1251:1516.) The plaintiffs twice asked the trial court to allow them to show that the
Hospital was not simply a small community hospital but was part of HCA, a
national chain of 160 hospitals, but the trial court denied their motions. (See R.

Id. 117 (quoting Barrett, 868 P.2d at 104).
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3018, at 444:21-445:9; R. 2527-55; R. 3021, at 1552:7-1565:12; R. 3022, at 1582:51611:8.) The trial court abused its discretion in doing so.
If a party interjects into a case incompetent or immaterial matters, it cannot
complain if the other side offers the same kind of evidence to correct a
misimpression or restore balance.16 "The rule of 'opening the door/ or 'curative
admissibility/ gives the trial court discretion to permit a party to introduce
otherwise inadmissible evidence on an issue (a) when the opposing party has
introduced inadmissible evidence on the same issue, and (b) when it is needed to
rebut a false impression that may have resulted from the opposing party's
evidence/'17 "While comments made in opening statements are not evidence . . . ,
the 'general principles involved in allowing a party to "meet fire with fire" are
applicable.'"18
Here, the Hospital violated its own motion in limine by appealing to
jurors' sympathy and creating the misleading impression that the Hospital was a
small, publicly owned hospital that could ill afford to pay a multi-million dollar
16

Barson ex rel. Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 840
(Utah 1984) (citations omitted).
17

United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 335 (2d Cir. 1993), cert denied, 511
U.S. 1042 (1994).
18

Martin v. State, 775 A.2d 385, 394 (Md. 2001) (citation omitted).
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judgment, which would adversely affect the jurors and their community. In fact,
the Hospital is part of a national, for-profit hospital chain. The only way the
plaintiffs had to combat the false and misleading impression that the Hospital
created was to introduce evidence of the Hospital's ties to HCA. The trial court
therefore abused its discretion by not allowing the plaintiffs to mention HCA
even after the Hospital had misled the jury.
C

The Trial Court Erred by Preventing the Plaintiffs from Showing the
Biases of Key Witnesses.
The trial court's ruling forbidding the plaintiffs from mentioning HCA not

only deprived the plaintiffs of an opportunity to examine prospective jurors fully
and left the jury with the false impression that the Hospital was a small
community hospital, but it also prevented the plaintiffs from showing the biases
of three critical witnesses.
The two most critical fact witnesses were Virginia Law, the labor and
delivery nurse who cared for Mrs. Braithwaite throughout the vast majority of
her labor and delivery and who the plaintiffs claimed should have called Dr.
Richards at 5:50 a.m., and Rynda Christensen, the nurse who replaced Ms. Law at
6:00 a.m. and who had Dr. Richards called at 6:05 a.m. Both testified in the
plaintiffs7 case-in-chief.
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The jury was not able to assess Ms. Law's credibility based on her memory
because Ms. Law had no memory of the events of the case. Within six months
after Trevin's birth, Ms. Law had electroconvulsive therapy treatments for
depression, which caused her to lose her memory. (See R. 3019, at 832:14-835:4.)
The jury therefore had to rely on other factors, such as personal interest and bias,
to evaluate her testimony.19 Although Ms. Law no longer works for the Hospital,
at the time of trial she worked for another HCA facility-St. Mark's Hospital.
(R.3019, at 838:25-839:4.)20 But the plaintiffs were not allowed to show that Ms.
Law still works for an HCA company.
Rynda Christensen no longer works for the Hospital either. She currently
works for Skyline Medical Center in Nashville, Tennessee. (See R. 3019, at 856:26, 859:24-25.) Skyline Medical Center is part of the TriStar Health System, which
is owned by HCA,21 but the plaintiffs were not allowed to show that either.
19

Cf. MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS (2D) CV121 ("Believability of
witnesses": "In evaluating the testimony of a witness, you may want to consider
the following: [<&] (1) Personal interest.... [f\ (2) Bias.... [1] (6) Memory/').
20

See HCA website, on-line at
http://www.hcahealthcare.com/cpm/utah.htm (listing St. Mark's Hospital as an
HCA facility). (All websites as visited May 16, 2009.)
21

See TriStar Health website, on-line at http://www.tristarhealth.com/,
which, under the heading "About TriStar," includes a link to "HCA Our Parent
Company."
22

Between working for the Hospital and going to work at Skyline Medical Center,
Ms. Christensen worked for HCA customer support. (R. 3019, at 860:3-20.) The
trial court let Ms. Christensen say that she went to work for HCA customer
support after she left the Hospital, but it did not let the plaintiffs explore the
matter further. The court sustained an objection to the question "What does
HCA stand for?" and cut off further inquiry, threatening a mistrial if the
plaintiffs mentioned HCA again. (See id. at 860:21-864:17.)
For all the jury knew, both Ms. Law and Ms. Christensen were
disinterested witnesses. As far as the jury could tell, neither still worked for the
Hospital or for any entity affiliated with the Hospital and thus had no reason to
testify in favor of the Hospital (other than to defend her own actions). In fact,
both Ms. Law and Ms. Christensen had a great incentive to testify favorably for
the Hospital, in order to maintain their current employment status.
Similarly, Carol Harvey, the Hospital's key expert witness and its only
witness on the standard of care applicable to hospital nurses, also has a working
relationship with HCA, the Hospital's parent corporation. She counts HCA as
one of her clients and has served as an expert for HCA in other cases involving
HCA hospitals-as many as one or more a year. (See R. 1849, at 150:16-151:12; R.
1894; R. 2546; R. 2529, at 14:7-15:1,17:5-22.) But the plaintiffs were not allowed to
23

show Ms. Harvey's relationship with HCA at trial. For all the jury knew, Ms.
Harvey had no reason to testify in favor of the Hospital, other than the fact that
she was being paid for her testimony in this particular case. But in fact, she had a
powerful incentive to testify in a way that helped the Hospital—in order to
continue working as an expert witness for HCA and its affiliated hospitals. HCA
is a lucrative source of potential income for any medical expert, since it owns and
operates 160 hospitals and 180 other medical facilities in 20 states across the
country, from Alaska to Florida.22
Had the plaintiffs been allowed to explore the relationships between these
witnesses and HCA, the Hospital's parent corporation, the jury would have had
great reason to view their testimony skeptically, since all had strong motivations
to help the Hospital with their testimony, so as to protect their livelihoods.
The Hospital and the trial court both recognized the importance of being
able to show a witness's bias in helping the jury assess the witness's credibility.

22

See HCA INC. Form 10-K, at HCA website at 3, 33, on-line at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/860730/000095014409001868/gl7725el0
vk.htm#tocpage; HCA website, on-line at
http://www.hcahealthcare.com/CustomPage.asp?guidCustomContentID=56B0A2
BE-268D-407A-BA31-3223710C7EC0# ("Our Family of Hospitals and Surgery
Centers").
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Yet the trial court's ruling deprived the plaintiffs of that opportunity with respect
to the key fact and expert witnesses.
Before trial, the Hospital tried to obtain personal financial information
from Paul A. Randle, the plaintiffs' expert economist. The plaintiffs moved on
behalf of Dr. Randle to quash the subpoena in part. (See R. 868-909.) At the
hearing on their motion, counsel for the Hospital argued that evidence of the
relationship between Dr. Randle and the law firm representing the plaintiffs was
important "not only to show potential bias but the extent of that bias." (R. 3015,
at 6:16-17.) She added:
If there's an extensive relationship there, there certainly is a
possibility of bias, that Dr. Randle has an incentive to continue that
relationship if he's been paid tens or hundreds of thousands of
dollars over the years. And we think the jury is entitled to see that if
it gets to that point.
(Id. at 6:21-7:2.) The trial court acknowledged that "the real central issue here[,]
the most important part of this case,... has to do with whether or not you're able
to explore potential bias adequately . . . . " (Id. at 8:10-13.) As will be shown
below, the trial court allowed the Hospital full opportunity to explore Dr.
Randle's alleged bias arising from his relationship with the firm representing the
plaintiffs, but, because of the trial court's ruling forbidding the mention of HCA,

25

the plaintiffs were not able to explore the potential biases of the Hospital's key
witnesses at trial.
In his opening statement to the jury, counsel for the Hospital warned them:
Now I want to talk just briefly about expert witnesses. You're
going to hear from a number of paid experts. Each side has hired
people to come in and testify for you. And there's a few things that I
want to ask you to watch for. Watch for experts that are making
more money testifying than they are practicing medicine; watch for
experts that have an incentive to testify or make criticisms for one side, that
really don't seem to make a lot of sense and don't fit with the other
things they're talking about, because what these experts are going to
tell you is, they're going to say you need to blame Ginger [Virginia
Law] and Rynda [Christensen] for what happened
(R. 3018, at 369:13-25 (emphasis added).) The trial court's ruling prevented the
plaintiffs from showing that "Ginger and Rynda" also had "an incentive to testify
or make criticisms for one side."
Counsel then compared its nursing expert, Ms. Harvey, with the plaintiffs'
nursing expert, Dr. Laura Mahlmeister:
Laura Mahlmeister . . . makes an awful lot of money testifying.
She testifies an awful lot all over the country. And just pay attention
to her testifying experience....
Carol Harvey . . . actually does not make most of her income
as a testifier. She is not traveling all over the country testifying
either for or against hospitals or nurses.
(Id. at 371:1-6, 373:16-20.)
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The Hospital repeated the comparison between Dr. Mahlmeister's
credibility and Ms. Harvey's in its closing argument:
And there's a long instruction [on] credibility and Fm not
going to read it to you[; you] can all read. But it talks about personal
interests, talks about b i a s , . . . . I assert to you I don't think she [Dr.
Mahlmeister] was free of bias
. . . You heard Carol Harvey . . . . [S]he's obviously very
knowledgeable and very credible and very reasonable.
(R. 3024, at 2257:3-8, 2259:4-9.) The Hospital "did a little bit of math" to estimate
how much money Dr. Mahlmeister earns as an expert witness and concluded,
"She's got a pretty powerful incentive to keep criticizing nurses." (Id. at 2257:1123.) Yet the plaintiffs were not allowed to show that Ms. Harvey had "a pretty
powerful incentive" not to criticize the nurses at an HCA hospital in order to
please a powerful client (HCA).
The Hospital's attack on the plaintiffs' damage experts also focused on
their credibility given the alleged incentives they had to testify favorably for the
plaintiffs.
For example, the Hospital spent a lot of time pointing out the relationship
between Kelly Lance, the plaintiffs' life-care planner, and the American
Association of Nurse Life Care Planners, an organization that she founded. (See
R. 3021, at 1310:25-1313:9,1317:23-1318:10.) The Hospital also highlighted the
27

following language from Ms. Lance's website to suggest that Ms. Lance may have
been slanting her testimony to get repeat business from the plaintiffs' attorneys:
If attorneys have a good experience with a consultant, they'll use the
same person again, and one attorney suggests that a nurse life care
planner only needs one decent lawyer to like you as an expert
witness and the rest of the cases will come to you as word of mouth.
(Id. at 1318:21-1319:3.) Defense counsel then pointed out that "there's really kind
of a business relationship between you as a life care planner, or any nurse really
as a life care planner, and the person who hires them" (id. at 1320:2-5), and that
"there's a customer service aspect of that business ...[;] if the lawyer likes you,
more likely than not, you're likely to get some more work and maybe some more
referrals" (id. at 1320:8-11). Recognizing that Ms. Lance was not likely to get any
repeat work from the Braithwaites, defense counsel defined her client as the
plaintiffs' law firm. (Id. at 1320:17-20.)
Ms. Harvey may not be likely to testify for the Hospital again any time
soon, but she could expect repeat business from HCA, the Hospital's parent, if
her testimony helped the Hospital win. Yet the plaintiffs were unfairly
prevented from cross-examining her the way that the Hospital cross-examined
Ms. Lance.

28

The Hospital took the same tack in cross-examining the plaintiffs' other
damage expert, Dr. Paul Randle, an economist. Before trial, the Hospital
subpoenaed all of Dr. Randle's records showing the amount of money he had
been paid by the law firm representing the plaintiffs since January 1,1999. (R.
875-76.) The plaintiffs moved to quash the subpoena on the grounds that, among
other things, it went beyond the scope of permissible expert discovery under the
rules of civil procedure and would have a chilling effect on the willingness of
experts to testify. (R. 869-71; R. 899-909.) The trial court granted the motion,
concluding that the documents produced under the expert discovery rules
provided sufficient information to guarantee the Hospital's right of crossexamination. (R. 965-66.)
At trial, counsel for the Hospital asked the court for a "clarification" of its
ruling and asked to be allowed to talk about "the time that [Dr. Randle]'s
provided consulting work and the amount of money he's been paid by [the
plaintiffs' law] firm in order to try and impeach his bias through [Utah] Rule [of
Evidence] 608." (R. 3021, at 1374:20-1375:14.) In support of its motion, defense
counsel relied on "the wide latitude in impeaching expert witnesses and showing
their bias" and asked the court to "be able to at least talk about the number of
times that he's served as a non-testifying consultant for plaintiffs' firm or any
29

plaintiffs' firm and for the amount of money he's received from that work." (Id.
at 1376:6-12.) The trial court reversed its prior ruling and allowed the Hospital to
cross-examine Dr. Randle about how much money he had made working with
the law firm representing the plaintiffs. (See id. at 1378:7-12.) The Hospital took
full advantage of this permission. About a third of its cross-examination of Dr.
Randle concerned his relationship with the plaintiffs' counsel's law firm. (See id.
at 1443:14-1452:4.) Yet the plaintiffs were precluded from asking the Hospital's
expert, Ms. Harvey, anything about her relationship with HCA.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the importance of being able to
examine witnesses for bias and has reversed judgments where that ability has
been unduly restricted. In Board of Education of South Sanpete School District v.
Barton,73 the court reversed a judgment entered on a jury verdict in an eminent
domain proceeding. The defendant landowner claimed that the jury award was
inadequate. At trial, the landowner sought to call a Mr. Ogden, who had
appraised the land for the plaintiff school board, but the trial court would not let
the landowner ask Mr. Ogden about his employment with the school board. The

617 P.2d 347 (Utah 1980).
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Supreme Court held that this was reversible error because "[tjhat testimony went
to the heart of the issue at trial." The court noted that the defendant
had strong reason and a legal right to ask Ogden the identity of his
employer.... To deny the defendant that right is to deny him a fair
trial. The jury was entitled to know the essential background facts of
the witness so as to be able to give proper weight to his testimony.24
Here, although the plaintiffs were able to ask Virginia Law and Rynda
Christensen the identity of their employers, because of the trial court's ruling
they were not able to show that their employers were owned by the same
hospital chain that owned the Hospital.
The plaintiffs also could not show the relationship between the Hospital's
expert, Carol Harvey, and HCA, the Hospital's parent. The Barton court noted,
"The term 'expert testimony' connotes a degree of objectivity imposed by the
discipline and training of the expert," but experts' opinions "often vary . . .
widely,"25 making the expert's credibility crucial. The court continued:
The [trial] court in this case prevented inquiry as to the
identity of the employer of an expert witness. The jury could not,
therefore, evaluate the process by which plaintiff chose his experts
nor determine the appropriate weight to be afforded the testimony
of the witnesses for the respective parties.

24

Id. at 350.

25

Id.
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. . . More importantly, his employment bore directly on the allimportant issue of his objectivity or bias. This information was essential
especially in light of the highly disparate views of the same facts that
may be arrived at by different experts.26
Similarly, in this case, the opinions of the parties' experts on the nursing
standard of care were diametrically opposed. Dr. Laura Mahlmeister, the
plaintiffs' nursing expert, testified that the Hospital breached the standard of care
by not calling Dr. Richards at least by about 5:50 a.m. (See, e.g., R. 3018, at 423:1424:11.) Carol Harvey, the Hospital's nursing expert, testified that the standard
of care did not require the Hospital to call Dr. Richards before it did, at about 6:05
a.m. (See, e.g., R. 3022, at 1748:21-25.) And there was evidence that, if Dr.
Richards had been called fifteen minutes sooner, Trevin Braithwaite would have
been born without the catastrophic injuries he suffered. (R. 3018, at 563:15-564:8;
R. 3019, at 951:4-953:17.) The Hospital was able to attack Dr. Mahlmeister's
credibility by showing that she made a good living testifying for plaintiffs, but
the plaintiffs were not able to show the relationship between Ms. Harvey's
livelihood and HCA.
The Barton court went on to explain that a witness may be biased as a
result of his or her relationship with a party and not even be aware of the bias:

26

Id. (emphasis added and citation omitted).
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Expert witnesses, like other witnesses, are influenced by
unconscious, and sometimes conscious, biases. The problem of the
expert witness's bias has been commented on by Dean Wigmore:
That bias itself is due, partly to the special fee which has
been paid or promised him, and partly to his prior
consultation with the party and his selfcommittal to a
particular view.27
If Ms. Harvey herself may not have been conscious of her bias in favor of the
Hospital because of her on-going relationship with HCA, the jury clearly could
not evaluate her potential bias because it did not even know of that relationship.
The trial court's ruling forbidding any mention of HCA deprived the
plaintiffs of their right to cross-examine Ms. Harvey for bias. "For two centuries,
common law judges and lawyers have regarded the opportunity of crossexamination as an essential safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of
testimony. They have insisted that the opportunity is a right, not a mere
privilege."28 Utah is no exception. Utah law recognizes the importance of cross-

27

617 P.2d at 350 (quoting 2 Wigmore on Evidence % 563 at 761
(Chadbourn rev. 1979)).
28

ON EVIDENCE § 19, at 45 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed.
2006) (footnotes omitted). See also, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965)
("There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court and other courts have
been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of
. . . cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of
fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal.").
MCCORMICK
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examination to a fair trial: "'Cross-examination is the principal means by which
the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested/" 29 "The
right to test the believability of a witness on cross-examination includes the right
to show a witnesses] possible bias or interest. The exposure of a witnesses]
motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally
protected right of cross-examination."30
Although a trial judge has discretion to limit cross-examination to some
extent (such as "'to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation'"),31
the scope of cross-examination as to credibility is and must be broad
if it is to fulfill its designated purpose of exposing bias and purging
testimony of intended or unintended error. Full exposure of a
witnesses] bias or prejudice is essential if a jury is to be able to fully
assess the existence and extent of the witness'[s] bias.32

29

State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650, 655 (Utah 1985) (quoting Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974)). Although Pointer, Leonard, and Davis were
criminal cases, implicating the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, "courts
have granted the right [of cross-examination] a measure of constitutional
protection in civil cases" as well. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 28, § 19,
at 46.
30

State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d at 656 (citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S.
474,496 (1959)).
31

Id. (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. at 316).

32

Id. (citations omitted).
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Therefore, "arbitrary curtailment" of the right of cross-examination "upon a
proper, important subject of cross-examination such as the witness's bias is
ground for reversal."33
Here, by precluding the plaintiffs from mentioning HCA at trial, the trial
court prevented them from showing the bias of Virginia Law, Rynda
Christensen, and Carol Harvey. The trial court deprived the plaintiffs of a key
weapon that their opponent was able to use with effect—the ability to test a
witness's credibility by showing the witness's business or employment
associations, which would strongly suggest bias. The trial court abused its
discretion by improperly restricting the plaintiffs' examination of the key fact
witnesses and the Hospital's liability expert. The Court should therefore reverse
the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for a new trial.
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supra note 28, § 19, at 47. See also State v.
Leonard, 707 P.2d at 656 ("Because cross-examination for bias is 'so vital a
constitutional right'... and was unduly restricted in this case, we hold that the
trial court [committed reversible error] in limiting the defendant's crossexamination of" the prosecution's witness) (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 320).
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
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II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT ALLOWING THE PLAINTIFFS
TO CALL REBUTTAL WITNESSES.
At the close of the Hospital's case, the plaintiffs asked to call two rebuttal
witnesses-Dr. Michael Nageotte and Judith Walker. (See R. 3023, at 2078:7-22.)
The trial court denied the requests. Having precluded the plaintiffs from
showing Ms. Harvey's bias, the trial court committed reversible error by also
preventing the plaintiffs from rebutting her testimony.
A.

The Trial Court Erred When It Did Not Allow the Plaintiffs to Call Dr.
Nageotte in Rebuttal.
The plaintiffs sought to call as a rebuttal witness Dr. Michael Nageotte, an

expert who literally wrote the book on fetal heart monitoring. (See R. 1357.) Dr.
Nageotte was originally designated as an expert by Dr. Richards (R. 205-06) and
was deposed early in the case (see R. 258-59; R. 1379). The plaintiffs reserved the
right to call any of the defendants' experts (R. 827, f 3) and designated Dr.
Nageotte as a trial witness (R. 1011,14). So there is no claim that Dr. Nageotte
was not timely identified or that the Hospital would have been surprised by his
testimony.
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The Hospital moved before trial to preclude Dr. Nageotte from testifying
that the Hospital breached the standard of care because Dr. Nageotte was not a
nurse and because his testimony would be cumulative of that of the plaintiffs'
nursing expert (Dr. Mahlmeister). (See R. 1338-39.) The trial court took the
motion under advisement. (See R. 3019, at 811:17-822:11.)
At the conclusion of the Hospital's case, the plaintiffs asked to read Dr.
Nageotte's deposition to rebut the testimony of the Hospital's liability expert, Ms.
Harvey, on the interpretation of fetal monitoring strips. (See R. 3023, at 2077:1013, 2084:14-20.) Ms. Harvey testified that the nurses did not need to call Dr.
Richards at 5:50 a.m. (R. 3022, at 1748:21-25.) Dr. Nageotte would have testified
that Dr. Richards should have been called at 5:50 a.m. because the fetal heart
monitoring strip indicated a problem with the baby at that time, and, if Dr.
Richards had been called then, he could have responded appropriately. (See R.
3023, at 2086:15-19.) The trial court denied the motion, saying that the testimony
was "cumulative" and was being offered for an improper purpose, namely, to
rehabilitate the plaintiffs' own expert, Dr. John Elliott (See id. at 2085:25-2086:1,
2093:9-13.)
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Dr. Nageotte's testimony was proper rebuttal testimony because it tended
to "refute, modify, explain, or otherwise minimize or nullify" Ms. Harvey's
testimony that it was okay for the nurses not to have called Dr. Richards at 5:50
a.m.34 The fact that the plaintiffs may have been able to present Dr. Nageotte's
testimony as part of their case-in-chief does not mean that it was not proper
rebuttal evidence. 35 Similarly, just because Dr. Nageotte's testimony may have
overlapped with testimony in the plaintiffs' case-in-chief or even contradicted
that testimony was not a valid basis for excluding the evidence. 36
'"Fundamental fairness requires that a party be permitted to introduce
evidence to rebut inferences the jury can draw from the opposing party's
evidence.'" 37 Here, the trial court excluded such evidence, thereby depriving the
plaintiffs of a fair trial. The Court should therefore reverse the judgment.

34

See Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329,1338 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted).

35

Astill v. Clark 956 P.2d 1081,1086 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("evidence
should not be excluded from rebuttal merely because it could have been made
part of the case-in-chief") (citations omitted).
36

See Randle, 862 P.2d at 1338 ("As a general rule, testimony presented
for the purpose of rebuttal should be admitted, even if the rebuttal is somewhat
repetitive of testimony on issues addressed during the case-in-chief.") (citations
omitted).
37

Astill 956 P.2d at 1087 (quoting Morrison v. Air Cal, 699 P.2d 600, 603
(Nev. 1985)).
38

B.

The Trial Court Erred When It Did Not Allow the Plaintiffs to Call Ms.
Walker in Rebuttal.
In her trial testimony, Ms. Harvey, the Hospital's nursing expert, testified

at length about what she teaches nurses about reading fetal heart monitor strips.
{See, e.g., R. 3022, at 1700:25-1702:1,1741:24-25,1785:7-23,1789:15-19,1790:21-23,
1801:6-1808:21,1821:2-22,1826:20-1827:12.) The plaintiffs were prepared to call a
witness, Judith Walker, a nurse from Colorado, who would have testified that
what Ms. Harvey told the jury was different from what she taught nurses in her
seminars and training programs. {See R. 3023, at 2077:20-14, 2081:14-2082:11.)
This was classic rebuttal testimony.38 Ms. Walker's testimony was proper
rebuttal testimony "because its purpose was to minimize the effect of [Ms.
Harvey's] testimony and undermine the bases of [her] conclusions."39 Evidence
that the defendant's expert teaches nurses differently from the way she was

38

See, e.g., Randle, 862 P.2d at 1338 ("Rebuttal evidence is evidence
tending to refute, modify, explain, or otherwise minimize or nullify the effect of
the opponent's evidence/') (citation omitted); Astill, 956 P.2d at 1086 (rebuttal
evidence is "evidence required to counter new facts presented in the defendant's
case-in-chief") (citation omitted); Roundy v. Staley, 1999 UT App 229, \ 12, 984
P.2d 404 ("rebuttal evidence is that which a party may or may not use, depending
on the testimony elicited at trial"), cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999).
39

See Randle, 862 P.2d at 1338.
39

expected to testify at trial was not properly part of the plaintiffs' case-in-chief but
was pure rebuttal evidence.40
The trial court excluded the testimony under Turner v. Nelson41 because, it
concluded, the plaintiffs could have reasonably anticipated the need for the
testimony before trial and did not disclose Ms. Walker as a potential rebuttal
witness within the time required for disclosures. (See R. 3023, at 2083:22-2084:9.)
This case is distinguishable from Turner. In Turner, the court ordered the
parties to disclose all witnesses by a certain date, "without differentiating
between case-in-chief and rebuttal witnesses,"42 and neither party distinguished
between case-in-chief and rebuttal witnesses in their pretrial designations. Here,
on the other hand, the parties' pretrial disclosures of witnesses were governed by
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(4). (See R. 104-06; see also R. 118-20; R. 145; R.
255-56; R. 290-91; R. 821-25.) That rule requires parties to disclose the names of
witnesses that they "may present at trial other than solely for impeachment."*3 Also,

40

Cf Astill, 956 P.2d at 1086 (a plaintiff "need not anticipate and then
disprove defendant's potential theory of the case") (citations omitted).
41

872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1994).

42

See id. at 1024, n.2, & 1022.
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R. CIV. P. 26(a)(4) (emphasis added).
40

the plaintiffs' trial witness list distinguished between witnesses they intended to
call in their case-in-chief and rebuttal witnesses. (See R. 1010,f8.)
Ms. Walker's testimony was solely to impeach Ms. Harvey's testimony and
thus was not required to be disclosed sooner under rule 26(a)(4). Moreover, part
of Ms. Walker's proposed testimony was based on a presentation that Ms.
Harvey made to nurses just a few weeks before trial and that Ms. Walker just
became aware of. (See R. 3022, at 1801:15-1802:5.) The plaintiffs could not have
anticipated the need for this testimony when they served their trial witness list
thirty days before trial. (See R. 3023, at 2084:20-24.) The trial court therefore
erred when it refused to allow the plaintiffs to call Ms. Walker in rebuttal.
C.

The Trial Court Erred When It Did Not Allow the Plaintiffs to Call
Nurse Anderson in Rebuttal.
Before the Hospital retained Carol Harvey as an expert, it designated

another expert on the standard of care applicable to nurses and hospitals—Laurie
Anderson, a local nurse who was not affiliated with HCA. (See R. 247-49.)44 At
her deposition, Ms. Anderson gave testimony favorable to the plaintiffs. She
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According to her curriculum vita, Ms. Anderson worked for Utah
Valley Pediatrics and Primary Children's Medical Center (R. 247), neither of
which are HCA facilities. See HCA website, available on-line at
http://www.hcahealthcare.com/CustomPage.asp?guidCustomContentID=56B0A2
BE-268D-407A-BA31-3223710C7EC0#.
41

testified that the presence of blood-tinged fluid when Mrs. Braithwaite's
membranes were ruptured could be a sign of a partial placental abruption that
should have put the nurses on a higher level of alert to monitor the patient,
particularly, to watch the fetal heart monitor more intensely for decelerations. (R.
2101, at 37:14-24, 38:9-17.) She testified that the nurses should have prepped Mrs.
Braithwaite for a C-section after they had tried other means of bringing the
baby's heart rate back after the deceleration at 5:48 a.m. (R. 2098, at 49:15-50:6.)
She testified, contrary to Ms. Harvey, that it was a breach of the standard of care
for Nurse Law to have tried scalp stimulation on Trevin during a deceleration.
(Id. at 50:7-51:11. Cf. R. 3022, at 1741:24-1742:6 (while Ms. Harvey doesn't
recommend or teach doing scalp stimulations during a deceleration, "[i]t seems
to be very common around the country").) Ms. Anderson testified, contrary to
Ms. Harvey, that Nurse Law probably did not have enough training to be in
charge of Mrs. Braithwaite's monitoring without supervision. (R. 2097, at 56:8-25;
R. 2096, at 57:1-4. Cf. R. 3022, at 1757:4-14 (according to Ms. Harvey, Ms. Law
had adequate training and education in fetal monitoring).) Ms. Anderson
testified, contrary to Ms. Harvey, that Dr. Richards should have been called a
little sooner and that, if he had been and Mrs. Braithwaite had been prepped for
surgery, there probably would not have been an injury to Trevin. (R. 2096, at
42

58:2-59:12. Cf. R. 3022, at 1727:20-23,1729:12-17 (according to Ms. Harvey, Dr.
Richards did not need to be summoned back before 6:00 a.m.) Ms. Anderson also
testified that the nurses should have communicated to the emergency room
doctor, Dr. Roberts, that the baby might need to be delivered emergently, and if
they had, the C-section could have been started at 6:03 a.m. (R. 2095, at 62:1864:13.)
Well after the deadline for designating liability experts had passed, the
Hospital designated Ms. Harvey as an expert. (R. 595-98.) The plaintiffs moved
to strike the designation as untimely and cumulative. (R. 736-45.) After briefing
on the motion was complete, the Hospital got a letter from Ms. Anderson saying
that she did not wish to testify at trial and "will no longer be available as an
expert witness/' (R. 801.) Based in large part on Ms. Anderson's unavailability,
the trial court allowed the Hospital to call Ms. Harvey as an expert at trial, but
indicated that the court's inclination was to let the plaintiffs use Ms. Anderson's
deposition at trial. (See R. 3014, at 27:9-14, 28:1-12, 28:25-29:13.)
The Hospital moved in limine to exclude Ms. Anderson's testimony. (R.
1066-67.) The plaintiffs responded that they should be allowed to use Ms.
Anderson's deposition during cross-examination of the Hospital's experts and in
rebuttal. (R. 2114-23.) The trial court granted the Hospital's motion on the
43

grounds that Ms. Anderson was not qualified to testify as an expert and that her
testimony would be cumulative of Dr. Mahlmeister's testimony. (R. 3019, at
810:18-811:11.)
There was sufficient evidence in the record to show that Ms. Anderson was
"qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education/'45
The Hospital thought she was qualified as an expert because it designated her as
one. Ms. Anderson taught labor and delivery management up through 1995,
four years before Trevin's birth. (See R. 2081-85; R. 2107, at 16:4-11.) Although
she had not practiced labor and delivery management since 1985, she stayed
current in the field by reading journals and doing continuing education classes.
(R. 2106, at 17:7-19.) She taught fetal heart monitoring at Weber State University.
(Id. at 20:10-19.) Ms. Anderson considered herself an expert in fetal heart
monitoring as of 1995 and thought the standards had not changed since then. (R.
2105, at 22:3-24.)
The fact that some of Ms. Anderson's opinions were also held by Dr.
Mahlmeister was not grounds for excluding her as a rebuttal witness.46 The fact

45

UTAH R.EVID.

702(a).

46

See, e.g., Randle, 862 P.2d at 1338 ("As a general rule, testimony
presented for the purpose of rebuttal should be admitted, even if the rebuttal is
44

that Ms. Anderson was retained as an expert for the Hospital gave her testimony
weight that the other experts' testimony did not have.
In Board of Education of South Sanpete School District v. Barton,47 the court
held that it was error not to let the defendant call an expert who had prepared an
appraisal at the request of the plaintiff without allowing the defendant to elicit
the fact that the witness had been employed by the plaintiff. The witness's
testimony was "directly probative of the central issue in the case."48 Moreover,
[t]hat testimony, with the likelihood of greater objectivity, would have
served to rebut the... testimony of plaintiffs expert witnesses. To deny
the defendant that right is to deny him a fair trial. The jury was entitled
to know the essential background facts of the witness so as to be able
to give proper weight to his testimony.
The defendant had a right to bring to the jury's attention the
fact that a witness had been initially enlisted by plaintiff and
pursuant to that employment had acquired his knowledge and
formed his opinion
The circumstances by which [the witness]
became aware of the facts needed to form his opinion provided the
necessary foundation for the jury to weigh the . . . testimony. More
importantly, his employment bore directly on the all-important issue of his
objectivity or bias. This information was essential, especially in light of the
somewhat repetitive of testimony on issues addressed during the case-in-chief.")
(citations omitted); Astill, 956 P.2d at 1086 ("evidence should not be excluded
from rebuttal merely because it could have been made part of the case-in-chief")
(citations omitted).
47

617 P.2d 347 (Utah 1980).

48

Id. at 350.
45

highly disparate view of the same facts that may be arrived at by different
experts}9
Here, on the same facts, Dr. Mahlmeister and Ms. Harvey testified,
respectively, that the Hospital did and did not breach the standard of care. The
Hospital had previously put forth an expert who conceded that the Hospital had
breached the standard of care in some respects. After new counsel took over the
case for the Hospital and the plaintiffs moved to strike its belated designation of
Ms. Harvey as another expert, Ms. Anderson suddenly became unavailable to
testify. The plaintiffs were "clearly . . . entitled'' to the testimony of Ms.
Anderson "simply because it may well have been less likely to be biased than
[that of] any of the other experts called by the parties/' 50 Ms. Anderson's
opinions were arrived at "under the direction of the party adverse to the party
who sought to adduce [her] testimony and thus carried a mark of objectivity that
may not have been commanded by the other experts."51 "It is axiomatic that an
attack on the credibility of a party's witnesses may be conducted by the other

49

Id. (emphasis added).

50

See id. See also UTAH R. Civ. P. 32(a) (any deposition may be used for
the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of a deponent as a
witness or for any other purpose permitted by the Utah Rules of Evidence).
51

Barton, 617 P.2d at 350.
46

party either by his own cross-examination of the witnesses or by calling other
witnesses to accomplish that purpose/' 5 2
The trial court abused its discretion by not allowing the plaintiffs to attack
Ms. Harvey's credibility by calling Ms. Anderson in rebuttal.

III.
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE TRIAL COURTS ERRORS
DEPRIVED THE PLAINTIFFS OF A FAIR TRIAL.
Under the cumulative error doctrine, an appellate court will reverse if the
cumulative effect of the trial court's errors undermines its confidence that a fair
trial was had. 53 Although a trial court has some discretion in the admission of
evidence, the trial court here abused its discretion. Even if no single error alone
would justify reversal, the cumulative effect of the trial court's decisions
deprived the plaintiffs of a fair trial, thereby affecting their substantial rights and
requiring a new trial.54
52

Id. (citation omitted).

53

Radman v. Flanders Corp., 2007 UT App 351, % 20,172 P.3d 668
(citations omitted), cert denied, 186 P.3d 957 (Utah 2008).
54

See U T A H R. EVID. 103(a); 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W.

GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§§ 5035, at 616 ("a series of

evidentiary errors, none of which could qualify as 'reversible error' but which
47

The trial court's decision to preclude any mention of HCA affected every
aspect of the trial, from voir dire through closing arguments. It prevented the
plaintiffs from exploring the critical area of bias not only with the jury venire but
also with the key fact witnesses and the Hospital's only liability expert. It also
allowed the Hospital to appeal to the jurors' sympathies by leaving the jury with
the misleading impression that any verdict against the Hospital would be against
their own "community hospital."
The trial court's decisions with respect to Dr. Nageotte, Ms. Walker, and
Ms. Anderson deprived the plaintiffs of any witness to rebut the testimony of Ms.
Harvey, the key witness in the case.
The plaintiffs had the burden of proof. They established a prima facie case
of negligence against the Hospital through the testimony of their nursing expert,
Dr. Mahlmeister. But that prima facie case only stands until its weight is met by
evidence to the contrary. If all the plaintiffs had was their prima facie case, the
Hospital "need not overcome it by a preponderance of evidence" but could

collectively suffice to justify a reversal" is cumulative error) (footnote omitted), &
5035.2, at 631 ("A single error in admitting or excluding evidence may appear
trivial but when the error is repeated over and over or is combined with other
different errors, courts may find the sum of the 'harmless' errors to be
reversible.") (footnote omitted) (2nd ed. 2005).
48

prevail if it only "equalize[d]" or "just counterbalance[d]" the plaintiffs' case.
Ms. Harvey contradicted Dr. Mahlmeister's testimony. It was therefore critical
that the plaintiffs have an opportunity to fully attack Ms. Harvey's credibility
and rebut her testimony.
The trial court's rulings improperly restricted the plaintiffs from crossexamining Ms. Harvey to show her motive to favor HCA, the Hospital's parent
company, and they deprived the plaintiffs of any rebuttal witness. The trial
court's rulings therefore had the effect of immunizing the Hospital's key liability
witness from attack. Yet the Hospital was given full rein to attack the plaintiffs'
experts for bias arising out of their associations. The effect of the trial court's
rulings was to make Ms. Harvey bulletproof. In effect, Trevin Braithwaite was
forced to enter the ring with one hand tied behind his back. The jury apparently
accepted Ms. Harvey's testimony at face value, because it accepted her judgment
that the Hospital did not breach any standard of care and never reached the
questions of causation and damages. By unfairly restricting the plaintiffs' ability
to challenge Ms. Harvey's credibility and refute her testimony, the trial court's

55

Topinka v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 248 N.W. 660, 662 (Minn.

1933).
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rulings affected the plaintiffs7 substantial rights and deprived them of a fair trial,
requiring reversal.56
CONCLUSION
The trial court's rulings forbidding any mention of HCA, the Hospital's
parent company, and denying the plaintiffs any opportunity to present rebuttal
testimony deprived the plaintiffs of a fair trial. The Court should therefore
reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case to the district court
for a new trial.
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Cf. Turner, 872 P.2d at 1023 (the court will reverse where "the trial
court has clearly abused its discretion and thereby affected the appellant's
substantial rights") (citations omitted).
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ADDENDUM
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26. General provisions governing discovery.

(a)(4) Pretrial disclosures. A party shall provide to other parties the
following information regarding the evidence that it may present at trial other
than solely for impeachment:
(a)(4)(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and
telephone number of each witness, separately identifying witnesses the party
expects to present and witnesses the party may call if the need arises;
(a)(4)(B) the designation of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be
presented by means of a deposition and, if not taken stenographically, a
transcript of the pertinent portions of the deposition testimony; and
(a)(4)(C) an appropriate identification of each document or other exhibit,
including summaries of other evidence, separately identifying those which the
party expects to offer and those which the party may offer if the need arises.
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the
disclosures required by subdivision (a)(4) shall be made at least 30 days before
trial. Within 14 days thereafter, unless a different time is specified by the court, a
party may serve and file a list disclosing (i) any objections to the use under Rule
32(a) of a deposition designated by another party under subparagraph (B) and
(ii) any objection, together with the grounds therefor, that may be made to the
admissibility of materials identified under subparagraph (C). Objections not so
disclosed, other than objections under Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, shall be deemed waived unless excused by the court for good cause
shown.
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 32. Use of depositions in court proceedings,
(a) Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an
interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible
under the rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and
testifying, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the
taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof, in accordance with
any of the following provisions:
(a)(1) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of
contradicting or impeaching the testimony of a deponent as a witness or for any
other purpose permitted by the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(a)(2) The deposition of a party or of anyone who at the time of taking the
deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent, or a person designated
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a public or private corporation,
partnership or association or governmental agency which is a party may be used
by an adverse party for any purpose.
(a)(3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by
any party for any purpose if the court finds:
(a)(3)(A) that the witness is dead; or
(a)(3)(B) that the witness is at a greater distance than 100 miles from the
place of trial or hearing, or is out of the United States, unless it appears that the
absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition; or
(a)(3)(C) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age,
illness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or
(a)(3)(D) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure
the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or
(a)(3)(E) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances
exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the
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importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to
allow the deposition to be used.
(a)(4) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, an
adverse party may require him to introduce any other part which ought in
fairness to be considered with the part introduced, and any party may introduce
any other parts.
Substitution of parties pursuant to Rule 25 does not affect the right to use
depositions previously taken; and when an action has been brought in any court
of the United States or of any state and another action involving the same subject
matter is afterward brought between the same parties or their representatives or
successors in interest, all depositions lawfully taken and duly filed in the former
action may be used in the latter as if originally taken therefor. A deposition
previously taken may also be used as permitted by the Utah Rules of Evidence.
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Utah Rule of Evidence 702. Testimony by experts,
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise.
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the
basis for expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles or
methods underlying the testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i) are
reliable, (ii) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have been reliably
applied to the facts of the case.

56

